Skip Navigation



Brain Advance Access published online on April 23, 2007
Brain, doi:10.1093/brain/awm075
This Article
Right arrow Full Text Freely available
Right arrow FREE Full Text (PDF) Freely available
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
130/8/1984    most recent
awm075v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in PubMed
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Disclaimer
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Zeman, A.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
PubMed
Right arrow PubMed Citation
Right arrow Articles by Zeman, A.
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author (2007). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Guarantors of Brain. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Sherrington's philosophical writings–A ‘zest for life’

Adam Zeman

Peninsula Medical School, Exeter, EX2 4UD, UK

Correspondence to: Adam Zeman, Peninsula Medical School, Exeter, EX2 4UD, UK E-mail: adam.zeman{at}pms.ac.uk

Sherrington's late writings are often described ad dualistic, yet Sherrington was deeply uneasy with theories that radically separate mind and brain. His questioning, open-minded and historically-informed approach to their relationship eschews dogmatic solutions.

Key Words: Sherrington; mind-brain problem; soul


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.